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Abstract
General issues of the errors occurrence by technical personnel were considered, 
their causes and consequences. Classifications of errors based on an ergonomic under-
standing of their nature, as well as on the results of an engineering-psychological 
analysis of operators’ activity are given. Much attention is paid to the methods used 
by ICAO to classify errors and violations. Details considered models SHELL and 
J. Reason. Their adaptation is presented for analysis cases of the impact of the techni-
cal maintenance quality on the flight safety of aircraft. A special place is occupied 
by the disclosure of assessing issues impact of technical personnel errors on flight 
safety. A wide range of existing methods and models is presented, allowing obtaining 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of this effect in order for the prevention of 
errors by technical personnel and mitigating their consequences.
Keywords: maintenance, technical staff, particular qualities of professional activities 
of technical staff, errors, classifications, causes, consequences, ICAO models, general 
research methods, expert methods, mathematical modeling
1. Introduction
The problem of human error is by no means new. World literature is replete with 
reports of accidents and disasters, where people are recognized as the main cause. 
However, the actualization of this problem, its isolation into a separate science, “the 
human factor,” occurred not so long ago, only 30–40 years ago.
In the aviation industry, the term “human factor” began to be widely used in the 
second half of the 80s of the XIX century, due to the recognition of this problem by 
the ICAO Assembly, which adopted resolution A26-9 in 1986 in which, in particular, 
the importance of recognizing the role of human factor in aircraft operations, as well 
as the need to develop for them practical material and activities related to the human 
factor. It was the awareness of the breadth of the problem and its consequences for 
flight safety that made it possible to move from studying the influence of individual 
errors on the safety of the aviation system to studying the causes of their occurrence, 
which is the essence and subject of the study of the “human factor.”
Considering the issues of the “human factor” and its impact on flight safety, the 
main emphasis is made by the majority of experts on the analysis of its manifestation 
in the practice of the flight crews and personnel performing maintenance and air 
traffic control. At the same time, in our opinion, little attention is paid to the prob-
lem of the manifestation of the human factor during maintenance and inspection 
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of aircraft. Nevertheless, this problem becomes more and more significant every 
year, which is confirmed, for example, by the materials of [1–3] and a number of 
other official sources, including official documents adopted by FAA, EASA, ICAO in 
recent years [4, 5], materials of relevant seminars on the human factor, etc.
The rapid development of the global aviation market in the future will only aggra-
vate the human factor problem. Thus, according to forecasts of the leaders of the global 
aviation market, the companies Airbus and the Boeing [6, 7], world park of com-
mercial aircraft by 2038 will amount to more than 48,000 aircraft, which will require 
putting into operation according to various forecasts from 39,200 to 42,700 units of 
new aircraft with a capacity of 100 seats. In this case, the maximum growth rate of the 
park, according to the agency “Oliver Wyman” [8], will be observed in the first decade 
from 2020 to 2029. These will be fundamentally new aircraft, which will require about 
620–640 thousand of well-trained technical personnel for their service. Therefore, 
the contradiction between the needs of the market and the readiness of the aviation 
personnel training system to provide the market with so many technical specialists 
without loss of training quality seems to be tidy. In addition, it should be taken into 
account that even with the most optimistic forecasts, a significant market share is 
about 8.5 thousand according to [7] will still consist of aircraft of outdated structures 
with operating lives exceeding 25 years. The level of reliability of such equipment 
and safety, as shown in [9], is significantly lower than that of the entire park, which 
imposes additional requirements on the level of training of technical specialists.
Of course, it is only predictions, the validity of which we will be able to evalu-
ate only after some time. However, regardless of the results forecasts, now become 
quite clear that the role of human factors in maintenance will only increase, pro-
viding more and more critical impact on the safety of civil aviation. Therefore, it 
is extremely important to develop analytical tools to identify problematic issues 
arising from aircraft maintenance and inspection, to predict possible consequences 
and to develop mechanisms to avoid, reduce or isolate manifestations of the human 
factor during the work of technical personnel.
2.  Maintenance errors, statistics, causes, and consequences for the 
flights safety
2.1 Maintenance error statistics
The key concept in the study of the human factor and the subject of research in 
studying the problem are human errors, conditions and mechanisms of their occur-
rence, features of manifestation, and, of course, the consequences for the function-
ing of the system (technical, environmental, social, etc.).
It should be noted that according to the official statistics of the ICAO and other 
influential organizations that study the problem of flight safety, human errors in 
aviation account for 60–80% of all aviation accidents. Of course, the main carrier of 
these errors is flight crews. According to various sources, they account for between 
40 and 75% of all accidents and incidents that occur. Clear generalized data on 
technical personnel are not available. However, quite complete, although somewhat 
contradictory information about the magnitude of the problem has been published 
and is contained in documents [10–12].
So, in [10], the results of several studies are presented at once concerning the 
effect of human errors during maintenance and inspection of aircraft on the accident 
state in civil aviation. The most voluminous of them is the study conducted by Sears 
R.L. It contains the results of an analysis of 93 major aircraft accidents that occurred 
between 1959 and 1983. In accordance with it, the problem of maintenance and 
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inspection takes the fourth place among the factors directly affecting the accident 
rate in civil aviation, and is the main reason for about 12% of the incidents studied. 
At the same time, the results of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
studies published in 2000 at (for updated results see [11]) indicate that out of 14 acci-
dents that were investigated by the Council, 7 had the main reason is maintenance, 
which is 50% of all incidents. This allowed NTSB experts to conclude that service 
problems are growing as the design of the aircraft improves, as flight crews, person-
nel and air traffic control equipment are trained. A proportion of incidents related 
to these factors will decline, and the impact, technical service on the contrary will 
increase. Partially their predictions confirmed by data presented in [12], as well as by 
the annual safety reports of the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
In particular, in [12] states that the activities of an aircraft maintenance averaged 
10% of the threats that led to the 432 aircraft’s accidents in the period from 2009 to 
2013 year. Maintenance operations, including standard operating procedures and 
training systems, were recognized by latent conditions for 8% of the 338 non-fatal 
accidents that occurred during the same time period in world aviation.
A subsequent analysis of the statistical material available to us indicates a 
positive trend in the number of accidents, fatal accidents and non-fatal accidents. 
During the period from 2013 to 2018 the average number of accidents, for which 
the technical service, including standard operating procedures and training were 
considered latent conditions ranged from 3.2% for fatal accidents, to 16.2% for the 
non-fatal accidents. Maintenance Events are recognized as threats on average for 
6% of registered fatal accidents and 12% of non-fatal accidents. The highest values 
of these indicators registered for period 2014–2018, and amounted to respectively 
(latent conditions/Threats):
a. for accidents – 19/13%;
b. for fatal accidents – 8/7%;
c. for non-fatal accidents – 20/14%.
2.2 Causes of technical maintenance errors
The data presented above characterize the problem as a whole, without specify-
ing the reasons for its generation. However, it is not surprising, because speaking of 
the reasons we are faced with a conceptual and purely technical problem.
The concept of “cause” is part of a broader concept – “factor,” which, being 
the driving force of any process, phenomenon, contains individual causes and 
their combinations, which, in turn, determine its influence on these processes and 
phenomena. In this regard, we have a technical problem, which, speaking about 
errors in the maintenance and inspection of aircraft, does not allow us to clearly 
identify all the specific causes of their occurrence, since there are usually a lot of 
them, and many of them are latent in nature. Therefore, researchers often prefer to 
study the problem either by focusing on the consequences of the manifestation of 
causes, or by grouping them for separate study, or for other purposes [13, 14]. Only 
a few studies attempt to analyze the entire path “from cause to effect.” An example 
of such a study is to survey more 1300 licensed Engineers held in 1998 by Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau [10, 15]. An analysis of the results made it possible to iden-
tify the nine most common direct causes of errors of technical personnel (Table 1) 
for cases related to and not related to airlines.
Below is the ranked information about typical errors made by technical person-
nel in the process of aircraft maintenance (Table 2), as well as the results of studies 
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of the frequency of occurrence of these errors [10, 13]. For completeness, the results 
of several studies are immediately demonstrated (Tables 3 and 4).
1. Incorrect installation of components
2. Fitting of wrong parts
3. Electrical wiring discrepancies (including cross-connections)
4. Loose objects (tools, etc.) left in aircraft
5. Inadequate lubrication
6. Cowling, access panels and fairings not secured
7. Landing gear ground lock pins not removed before departure
Table 2. 
Errors in frequency [13].






Lack of equipment 8% 3%
Environment 5% 1%
Poor documentation 5% 4%
Poor procedure 4% 4%
Table 1. 
Causes of technical personnel errors [15].






The results of the analysis of 122 cases of engineering errors in the period 1989–1991 [16].
Errors Frequency of occurrence
Fastenings undone/incomplete 22%
Items left locked/pins not removed 13%
Caps loose or missing 11%
Other items left loose or disconnected 10%
Items missing 10%
Tools/spare fastenings not removed 10%
Lack of lubrication 7%
Panels left off 3%
Table 4. 
Research results by professor James Reason [17].
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2.3 Consequences of errors
Technical maintenance and inspection of air vessels are important components 
of the system to ensure the safety of flights of civil aviation. Moreover, when we 
talk about maintenance, we should not understand this term too narrowly and focus 
only on the mistakes made during its implementation. After all, mistakes can be 
made directly in the project, and in technical documentation, and in the organiza-
tion of work, etc. Speaking about maintenance errors, you should understand them 
as errors that are related to maintenance personnel.
In the Cir. ICAO 253-AN/151, technical maintenance personnel (hereinafter 
referred to as technical personnel) are defined as personnel who are at the forefront 
of resolving technical problems that arise during daily flights. Its activities are carried 
out under the influence of various conditions, which, aggregating into larger factors, 
directly affect the quality of work and operations. As a result of these influences, there 
are additional opportunities for errors of technical personnel, which, as a result, cause 
breaks in the safety chain of the aviation system. This is how the consequences are 
determined in a number of documents of ICAO and other authoritative organizations.
Speaking about the consequences that are possible as a result of errors made 
by the technical personnel of airlines and other organizations providing technical 
maintenance of modern aircraft, we should refer to the experience of research in 
this area, which has been brought up in a number of educational publications and 
practical experience on flight safety.
In accordance with the theory of safety, there are two large groups of conse-
quences of errors of technical personnel:
a. failures of aviation engineering in flight. Here, by aviation engineering, we 
mean the aircraft, its engines, as well as removable and permanently installed 
equipment on board the aircraft.
b. events, leading to the immediate threat of flights safety. This division has a 
number of drawbacks, but plays an important role in the selection of methods 
for assessing the impact of the reliability of technical personnel on the state of 
flight safety and will be rather fully discussed below. However, there is another 
idea of the consequences of errors, which is more understandable and consists 
in dividing all the events associated with them by:
• active failures – associated with errors or irregularities that immediately 
cause an adverse effect They are usually considered (retroactively) hazard-
ous activities. The operator of the “front line”, performing direct mainte-
nance and inspection of aircraft, usually makes such errors.
• hidden faults – are the result of decisions or actions that were committed 
long before the event and the consequences of which may not occur for a 
long time. Such failures are usually generated at the decision-making and 
rule-setting levels or at the level of linear leadership, that is, people far 
removed from what happened, both in time and location. Hidden failures 
resulting from dubious decisions or incorrect actions, although they do not 
cause harm if they are detected in isolation, can interact with each other, 
creating a “window of opportunity” for them to develop into active failures, 
which are destructive in essence to all types of system protection.
Here are a few examples, which demonstrate entered above classification of the 
consequences, and give brief explanations to them.




The crash of the aircraft Embraer EMB-120RT 11.09.1991 year near Eagle Lake 
(Texas, USA) [18].
Fatal accident circumstances: Continental Express’s Embraer EMB-120RT 
Brasilia airliner (operated by Britt Airwaysruen) operated a scheduled BTA 2574 
flight on the Laredo – Houston route, but lost control while approaching Houston 
Airport and crashed to the ground near Eagle Lake, Texas, killing all 14 people on 
board – 11 passengers and 3 crew members.
Information about the aircraft: Embraer the EMB-120RT Brasilia – released 
in 1987 year (the first flight 17 November 1987 year). April 15, 1988 was acquired 
by Continental Express airline. On the day of the disaster has made 10,009 cycles 
“takeoff-landing” and flown 7229 hours. On the eve of the flight, work was done to 
replace the anti-icing pads on the horizontal tail of the aircraft.
Reasons leading to fatal accident: This case is a vivid example of the occur-
rence of an active failure due to erroneous actions, violations of the company’s 
technical personnel when performing dismantling and installation work on the 
elements of the horizontal tail of the aircraft, immediately before the flight.
The incident was investigated by the NTSB.
According to its results, the following was indicated: “The failure of 
Continental Express maintenance and inspection personnel to adhere to proper 
maintenance and quality assurance procedures for the airplane’s horizontal sta-
bilizer deice boots that led to the sudden in-flight loss of the partially secured left 
horizontal stabilizer leading edge and the immediate severe nose-down pitchover 
and breakup of the airplane. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the 
failure of the Continental Express management to ensure compliance with the 
approved maintenance procedures, and the failure of FAA surveillance to detect 
and verify compliance with approved procedures.”
NTSB board member John K. Lauber filed a dissenting statement on the investi-
gation report, believing the probable cause should read as follows:
1. The failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate cul-
ture which encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and 
quality assurance procedures, and
2. the consequent string of failures by Continental Express maintenance and 
inspection personnel to follow approved procedures for the replacement of the 
horizontal stabilizer deice boots. Contributing to the accident was the inad-
equate surveillance by the FAA of the Continental Express maintenance and 
quality assurance programs.
2.3.1.2 Example 2
The crash of the Boeing 727-264 on March 31, 1986, near Maravatio (Mexico).
Fatal accident circumstances: The Mexicana Boeing 727-264 Advanced airliner 
made a MX940 flight on the route Mexico City – Puerto Vallarta – Mazatlan – Los 
Angeles, but 15 minutes after departure from Mexico City it caught fire, fell into 
two parts and crashed into Mount El Carbon, resulting in killing 167 people.
Information about the aircraft: Boeing 727-264 Advanced was manufactured 
by Boeing Corporation in 1981 (first flight May 4, 1981). In May and June of the 
same year was sold to airline Mexicana, which awarded him the name of Veracruz.
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Reasons leading to fatal accident: According to the “Aviation Safety Network” 
resource, the accident with the Boeing 727-264 Advanced was the result of a 
number of errors and violations that were made in preparing the aircraft for flight 
by technical personnel directly to the Mexico City airport. The main reasons are 
indicated:
a. brake failure of the left main landing gear;
b. violation of the technology of charging pneumatics of wheels, as a result of 
which air was inside them instead of neutral gas;
The low level of inspection for this important element of security did not allow 
us to identify these shortcomings in time and, therefore, did not allow us to prevent 
subsequent adverse events.
Due to these errors and violations, events developed as follows: “The left main 
gear brake was overheated during the takeoff run. When the aircraft had reached 
FL310 the heat caused a tire on the left hand main gear to explode. Fuel and hydrau-
lic lines were ruptured and electrical cables severed resulting in a cabin decompres-
sion. An emergency was declared, but spilt fuel ignited and caused a massive fire 
on board. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed into a mountain in the Sierra 
Madre, at an elevation of 9000 feet. It was found that the tire had been serviced 
with air rather than nitrogen. The air, under high temperature and pressure, 
resulted in a chemical reaction with the tire itself. This led to a chemical explosion 
of the tire” (Aviation Safety Network).
This is another example of active failures of aviation equipment in consequence 
of the action of human error during maintenance and inspection of aircraft. Their 
distinctive feature is the absence of long time intervals between the error and its 
consequence. Speaking about the hidden failures, we have a somewhat different 
picture. They are also caused by errors of technical personnel, but the consequences 
here are removed in time directly from the moment of the error. Let us illustrate this 
with examples.
2.3.2 Hidden failures
Examples of hidden failures are a series of incidents that have occurred over the 
past 50 years of civil aviation. Probably the most resonant of them are (events are 
given in chronological order):
1. The crash of the aircraft McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 of American Airlines 
in O’Hare International Airport Chicago (Illinois, USA) 05/25/1979.
2. The crash of a Boeing 737-222 aircraft of Far Eastern Air Transport airline 
151 km south of Taipei (CHINA) on 08/22/1981.
3. The crash of a Boeing 747SR-100 aircraft airline Japan Air Lines 08/12/1985, 
which was one of the most massive in the number of dead passengers.
4. The crash of a Boeing 737-200 aircraft by Aloha Airlines over Kahului (HA-
WAII, USA) on April 28, 1988.
5. The crash of a McDonnell Douglas McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 plane 
of United Airlines airline at the airport of Sioux City (Iowa, USA) on 
07/19/1989.
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6. The crash of a Boeing 747-200 aircraft of China Airlines over the Gulf of Tai-
wan on May 25, 2002.
There are many other examples where poor maintenance and manufacturing 
errors have caused the most recent military accidents in military aircraft.
Examples here are:
1. The accident of the F-15C aircraft, 110 aviation squadron, 131 fighter wings, 
Missouri National Guard during a training flight at the Lambert Field Air Base 
(St. Louis) 11/7/2007.
2. The crash of the Mi-24 helicopter 18 km from the airfield of Pugachev, Saratov 
Region, 10/03/2009.
3. The crash of the aircraft KS-130 over Liflor 07/10/2017.
However, the undisputed leader here is China Airlines Boeing 747-200 crash that 
occurred on May 25, 2002 over the Gulf of Taiwan [19].
Fatal accident circumstances: The China Airlines Boeing 747-200 airliner made 
a scheduled flight on the Taipei-Hong Kong route, but 25 minutes after take-off 
it suddenly fell apart in the air and crashed into Taiwan, killing all 225 people on 
board – 206 passengers and 19 crew members.
Information about the aircraft: Boeing 747-209B was produced in 1979 (the 
first flight on July 16, 1979). On July 31 of the same year, it was transferred to China 
Airlines with tail number B-1866; on January 1, 1999 it was re-registered and 
received tail number B-18255.
At the time of the crash, the aircraft had 64,810 flight hours (21,398 take-off 
cycles).
Reasons leading to fatal accident: The Aviation Safety Council (ASC) 
Investigation Report (China) notes that on February 7, 1980, 22 years before the 
crash, while landing at a Hong Kong  
airport, the aircraft touched the runway with its tail. Subsequently, the tail was 
repaired, and the aircraft continued to fly. It was at this moment, according to ASC 
experts, that the conditions of the 2002 incident were laid.
During the investigation, a number of organizational and technical flaws were 
identified, but the immediate causes that led to the disaster were:
a. poor-quality repair;
b. low efficiency of quality control during repair;
c. deficiencies in performing an aircraft inspection by a structural inspector;
d. flaws in the documentation defining the technology for the repair, maintenance 
and inspection of the aircraft, and others.
By the way, this is not the only disaster of this kind. A very similar accident 
occurred on 08/12/1985 with the Boeing 747SR-100 of Japan Air Lines [20].
Fatal accident circumstances:
The Japan Air Lines (JAL) airliner Boeing 747SR-46 made an internal flight JAL 
123 on the Tokyo – Osaka route, but 12 minutes after takeoff, the elements of the 
aircraft critical for control were destroyed (the vertical tail and the hydraulic pipe-
lines of the aircraft were destroyed). Despite the selfless struggle of the crew for the 
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survivability of the aircraft, an almost uncontrolled aircraft collided with Otsutaka 
Mountain 112 km from Tokyo 32 minutes after takeoff. Of the 524 people on board 
(509 passengers and 15 crew members) only 4 survived.
Aircraft Information: The Boeing 747SR-46 was released by “Boeing” in 1974 
(first flight on 28 January 1974 ode) on request for use on domestic flights in Japan. 
On February 19 of the same year, it was transferred to Japan Air Lines (JAL). 
On the day of the disaster, he made 18,835 takeoff and landing cycles and flew 
25,030 hours.
Reasons leading to fatal accident: In the course of the fatal accident investiga-
tion, Aircraft Accidents Investigation Commission specialists found that on June 2, 
1978, the JA8119, completing the JAL 115 flight on the Tokyo-Osaka route, hit its tail 
on the runway of Osaka Airport. As a result, the pressure bulkhead was damaged, 
separating the tail passenger compartment of the liner, which maintains approxi-
mately constant air pressure, from the leaky tail section of the aircraft.
During the repair process, the technical conditions stipulated by the Boeing 
company were not fulfilled, according to which it was prescribed to strengthen 
the damaged parts of the bulkhead using an integral amplifier plate fixed by three 
rows of rivets. Instead of installing a single amplifier with three rows of rivets, the 
repairing technicians used two separate reinforcing elements, one of which was 
fixed with a double row of rivets, and the second with only one row of rivets. Under 
the influence of variable loads during takeoff and landing cycles 7 hours after the 
impact, the bulkhead at the place of repair was destroyed.
Analyzing these two incidents, it should be noted once again the importance of 
ensuring high technological discipline in the maintenance, repair and inspection of 
aircraft. It should become an element of corporate culture of airlines. Very often, this 
is the only effective tool (protective mechanism) for preventing aircraft accidents.
3. Classifications of technical personnel errors
Having examined the issues of causes and consequences, we intentionally did not 
address issues relating to directly dangerous actions. They are characterized as person-
nel errors, when performing maintenance and inspection of aircraft, and which are 
identified by modern regulatory documents as actions or inaction, leading to devia-
tions from the intentions or expectations of the organization or specific individuals 
(Doc.9859, 2018 edition). This was partly because the fact of error alone does not carry 
the necessary useful information to effectively prevent their occurrence in the future. 
At the same time, a clear understanding of the causes of personnel errors allows the 
development of various preventive strategies to prevent their occurrence in the future. 
On the other hand, understanding the consequences allows us to assess the risks from 
the corresponding errors and to rank them according to the degree of criticality for 
flight safety or in terms of financial and material losses for the airline. The result of this 
approach is a tool that allows you to set clear s sequence and implementation of preven-
tive measures for the prevention of technical staff errors and optimizing, thus, possible 
losses of companies.
The presence of relationships such as “cause – dangerous action,” “dangerous 
action – consequence,” “cause – consequence” allows to classify errors of technical 
personnel, thereby reducing the degree of uncertainty that the relevant managers 
almost always encounter in the decision-making process.
There are a large number of different classifications of human errors, if we 
consider this issue from the point of view of the human factor, as a global problem. 
However, we will focus only on some of them, which, in our opinion, are of practi-
cal interest from the point of view of their applicability in the field under study.
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One of the main systems of descriptions of human error, which is already more 
than 50 years and is used by various researchers in the field of analysis of human 
reliability is a diagram referred to in A. D. Swain [21], according to which, human 
errors occur:
a. when a man fails to perform a task or a part of a task;
b. when he performs the task or step incorrectly;
c. when he introduces some task or step which should not have been performed;
d. when he not performs some task or step out of sequence, or
e. when he fails to perform the task or step within the allotted time period.
A somewhat different way of human operator error classification proposed D.A. 
Norman in [22], which is based on a psychological approach to the problem. He 
links groups of “working breakdowns” with alleged sources, which are modeled and 
analyzed using the activation-trigger-schema system (ATS) model.
Model ATS is composed of a set and schemes representing a sensorimotor 
cognitive structure. Each subsequent task in the model is considered as a hierarchy 
of schemes, changing the characteristics and activation modes of which it becomes 
possible to simulate the action of various sources that cause operator errors. 
Assuming the presence of these sources, Norman identified the following three 
main types of disruptions [22]:
a. errors in the formation of the intention (which includes the subcategories of 
mode and description errors);
b. faulty activation of schemas (which includes the subcategories of capture 
errors, data-driven and associative activations, loss of intention, and misorder-
ing of action components); and
c. faulty triggering (which includes the subcategories of spoonerisms, blends, 
intrusions of thoughts, and premature triggering).
As indicated in [23], the classification according to Norman is perfectly suitable 
for the theoretical analysis of the causes of human operator errors, but this classifi-
cation is not suitable for analyzing its reliability. The reasons are as follows:
a. the use of the Norman classification is based on activation-trigger schemes, 
without which it and the analysis method itself lose its meaning;
b. the practical use of the ATS model is problematic:
• due to the contradictory views of psychologists on human behavior;
• due to excessively high requirements for the level of professional training of 
performers (experience in cognitive psychology);
c. individual errors operator can be interpreted in various ways, which entails the 
destruction of the whole system is empirically obtained data.
11
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Classifications and models presented by Swain and Guttmann [24] are of 
great practical importance. They are a further development of the classification 
given in the work [21] and the most adapted for solving a task analysis of human 
reliability.
The scientific work clarifies the concept of external and internal factors affect-
ing productivity, gives a clear interpretation of intentional and not intentional 
errors, corrected (errors without consequences) and not corrected errors.
In the framework of the developed model for solving problems associated with 
the analysis of the reliability of the human operator, the wrong actions of the latter 
are considered by them in the framework of the following classification:
1. Errors of omission:
a. omits entire task;
b. omits a step in a task.
2. Errors of commission:
a. selection error:
• selects wrong control
• mispositions control (includes reversal errors, loose connections, etc.);
• issues wrong command or information (via voice or writing);







This classification partly echoes the classification of operator errors, which was 
developed, in particular, by Professor B. F. Lomov. The work of M. A. Kotik (“The 
Course of Engineering Psychologists”, 1978) provides a fairly extensive classifica-
tion of errors by the authors G. M. Zarakovsky and V. I. Medvedev, developed and 
presented by them in the work “Classification of Operator Errors” in 1971. It is 
proposed to analyze human errors using the following criteria:
a. places of error in the structure of the functioning of the “man–machine” 
system;
b. the outward manifestation of the error;
Safety and Risk Assessment of Civil Aircraft during Operation
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c. the consequences of the error;
d. the nature of the error display in the operator’s consciousness;
e. causes of error.
An interesting approach is the authors to analyze errors for the reasons for their 
occurrence. The following categories of error causes are highlighted here:
1. Immediate causes – differ from two points of view:
a. by place in the structure of activities:
• errors of perception (visual, auditory, kinesthetic, etc.);
• memory errors (storage, reproduction, short-term, long-term);
• decision-making errors (when acting according to the rules, in logical 
operations, when calculating, when thinking creatively);
• errors in the response (movement, speech response, memorization), etc.;
b. the following error types are distinguished by the form of violated laws:
• mismatch of the information processing process (excessive flow of 
information, lack of information, lack of input data, etc.);
• mismatch of the skill (transfer of the skill to the conditions where it is 
unacceptable, error switching skills, lack of skill, etc.);
• lack of attention (improper distribution of attention or switching atten-
tion, lack of concentration, excessive concentration).
2. The main causes of operator error are associated with the following factors:
a. operator’s workplace;
b. organization of work and rest;
c. preparing the operator and the system for a specific operation;
d. the physical and mental state of the operator;
e. motivation of the operator to perform the operation.
3. Causes contributing to the error.
Flow from the more fundamental properties of the operator. They are associ-
ated with the general attitudes of the operator’s personality, his general state of 
health, his training system, life organization, relationships in the team and in the 
family, etc.
Despite a fairly detailed study, the classification of G.M.Zarakovsky and V.I. 
Medvedev for objective reasons described in the work of M.A. Kotik, did not 
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receive wide recognition in solving psychological and ergonomic problems opera-
tor error analysis. However, the idea of dividing the causes into main, immedi-
ate and contributing, is actively used now in the analysis of errors of aviation 
personnel, as well as in the investigation of the causes of incidents and aircraft 
accidents.
Thus, all the above classifications are intended exclusively for solving ergonomic 
problems and performing engineering and psychological analysis of operators in 
the human-machine system and are practically not used for solving practical prob-
lems of assessing the reliability of aviation personnel of airlines. Nevertheless, their 
ideas, in particular the ideas laid down in [24], were continued when developing the 
classification of errors of aviation personnel into personal errors and human errors. 
In this classification:
1. Personal error (personal factor) – is errors that occur due to mismatch condi-
tions of work with individual properties of experts: level of professional 
training, physical and psychophysiological state, level of personal discipline 
and others. This often includes the reaction of technical personnel to changing 
external working conditions.
2. Human errors (human factor) – these are errors that arise in connection with 
the occurrence of conditions exceeding the capabilities of the personnel ac-
cording to the boundary standards of their psychophysiological capabilities, 
which are inherent in all people with the training necessary for professional 
activity, manifested in the interaction of specialists and technology.
The above classification is useful in that it establishes clear markers that allow, 
according to the results of the analysis of errors of technical personnel, to relate 
them to a particular group and, subsequently, apply corrective actions specific to a 
particular group of reasons.
On the other hand, the above classifications do not solve the problem of estab-
lishing the depth of responsibility of technical personnel for making mistakes, 
which is crucial when deciding on the development of preventive and corrective 
actions aimed at reducing the human factor influence on the flight safety state 
of airlines. At the same time, the effective implementation of proactive flight 
safety management systems for suppliers of products or services and the effective 
supervision of their functioning by the state require a clear understanding of the 
differences between the concepts of error and violation. This difference is the basis 
of the classification recommended for implementation in the practice of airlines of 
the ICAO member countries by document Doc.9859 “Safety Management Manual” 
(2013 edition).
In accordance with the ICAO classification, all dangerous actions associated with 
the human factor, including during maintenance and inspection of aircraft, are 
divided into two types: errors and violations.
An error is defined as an action or inaction by an operational person that 
leads to deviations from organizational or the operational person’s intentions or 
expectations.
A violation is defined as a deliberate act of willful misconduct or omission result-
ing in a deviation from established regulations, procedures, norms or practices.
As you can see, the difference between errors and violations is the intention 
of the performer. And if mistakes are an unintentional act, then the violation is 
a deliberate act or inaction in order to move away from established procedures, 
protocols, norms and practices. This is where the focus of Doc. 9859 is.
Errors of aviation personnel are divided into the following types:
Safety and Risk Assessment of Civil Aircraft during Operation
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1. Slips and lapses are failures in the execution of the intended action.
a. slips are actions that do not go as planned;
b. lapses are memory failures.
2. Mistakes are failures in the plan of action
Unfortunately, the mechanisms of these errors regarding the activities of techni-
cal personnel are poorly understood today. As for the flight crew, the error data of 
the pilots and their mechanisms are well disclosed in the works of N. A. Nosov, the 
founder of a fundamentally new scientific approach to the study of “virtual reali-
ties” of a person, his followers Pronin, Yuryev and others [25, 26].
ICAO is not categorical in matters of maliciousness of violations, which allows a 
balanced and fair approach to the issue of impact on personnel, allowing them out 
of the belief that this will simplify the tasks and will not lead to negative conse-
quences. ICAO proposes to identify such violations as judgments, and classifies 
them into types:
1. Situational violations are committed in response to factors experienced in a 
specific context, such as time pressure or high workload.
2. Routine violations become the normal way of doing business within a work 
group.
This type of violation arises as a response to difficulties with the implementation 
of the established rules of work, shortcomings in the organization of the man-
machine interface, etc. As a result, the performers, maintenance teams establish 
their own, as it seems to them, “best” rules, which eventually become mundane. 
As a result, we are dealing with a practical shift, the consequences of which may be 
most serious over time. Sometimes these personnel actions are justified and can be 
taken as an official’s procedures after carrying out the necessary examination and 
evaluation of safety risks.
3. Organizationally induced violations may be considered as an extension of rou-
tine violations.
This type of violation occurs when security requirements are sacrificed for 
immediate financial gain. Thus, as a rule, is disturbed balance between the desired 
level of productivity/profitability airlines and necessary layer eat protection 
(Doc.9859, 2018).
The value of the ICAO approach to the classification of human errors and 
violations consists, firstly, in its universality and adaptability. It can be applied with 
equal success both to the analysis of errors of flight crews and to the analysis of 
errors of technical personnel made by them during the flight operation, as well as in 
the process of maintenance and inspection of aircraft. Secondly, a clear division of 
the dangerous actions related to the human factor into errors, non-malicious viola-
tions (judgment errors) and intentional violations allows us to develop clear triggers 
that are used in the algorithms for analyzing errors/violations of airline personnel. 
An example of such an algorithm is presented in Figure 1.
Such algorithms are essential elements of the Safety Management Manual. 
They are developed by each individual airline as part of documentary support 
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for the creation of safety management systems for organizations. In addition, 
the presence of such algorithms with a well-defined and clear triggers (action 
rules) stimulates the creation within the fair airline safety culture, and their 
integration in the adopters a airline models and operation allows to identify 
the causes of errors in a timely manner they eliminate or reduce the severity of 
consequences.
4.  Models and theories of human factor. Modeling the aircraft 
maintenance process
The usefulness of error classifications is obvious and has been shown above. 
However, using only the classifications previously developed to study human errors, we 
significantly limit our ability to study their influence on the efficiency of the aviation 
system, which is largely determined by its flight safety status. Indeed, using only the 
information that is supplied to us by the existing classification of human errors, only 
one “static” state of the problem becomes available to us. At the same time, for a full 
study of the problem of the human factor, in particular, during maintenance and 
inspection of aircraft, consideration of the problem should be carried out taking into 
account its “dynamics”. Only in this case we can count on the maximum result in solving 
problems:
a. minimizing the risk of accidents due to human factors;
b. obtaining the most adequate assessment of the effectiveness of protective 
mechanisms even before their practical implementation;
c. the formation of a common vision of the problem by all participants in the 
aviation community.
Figure 1. 
Airline personnel error/violation analysis algorithm.
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Today, various approaches and models of the human factor are used in aviation. 
Their synthesis was possible due to many years of work such eminent scientists like 
J. Rasmussen, G. Heinrich, E. Adams, S. Shappell, J. Reason, D. Wiegmann and 
many others. Under their leadership and with their active participation, several 
directions and approaches to the study of the human factor, including in aviation, 
have been developed. These include [27]: cognitive, systemic, behavioral, psycho-
social, medical (psychophysiological) and organizational approaches. There are 
many publications on each of them, and each publication deserves close attention 
and analysis. However, due to objective reasons, we confine ourselves to a brief 
consideration of some of them in terms of applicability in practice of aircraft 
maintenance. Probably one of the most famous models, which represent a modern 
systematic approach to the consideration of the human factor, is the SHELL model. 
Proposed by Professor E. Edwards 1972 year, this model has received wide popular-
ity and in 1993 was recommended by ICAO as the basis for the analysis of human 
factors in accident investigation (Doc. ICAO 9859).
The model describes the four main components necessary for the successful 
integration of a person and his functioning as part of man–machine systems, the 
first letters of the name of which make up its name. These components include:
1. Software (S) – procedures (procedures, training, tools, and software, etc.).
2. Hardware (H) – object (machines, systems and equipment).
3. Liveware (L) – subject (people in the workplace).
4. Environment (E) – environment (operating conditions in which all other com-
ponents of the L-H-S system must function).
The SHELL model is based on the model of a person who, as a central element, 
interacts with its other elements. According to E. Edwards, it is precisely at the 
borders of these elements that problems arise that lead to erroneous human actions. 
Although this model is designed primarily to take into account all possible contex-
tual and task-related factors that affect the performance of the pilot, including the 
design of cockpit equipment, etc., it can also be adapted to the working conditions 
of technical personnel, which in principle and confirmed in Cir. ICAO 253-AN/151.
The model allows, when studying the features of the work of aircraft mainte-
nance specialists, to take them precisely as the central link, since they also operate 
in a specific environment specific to them (possibly even more complex than that 
of the flight crew), they use complex equipment H, and numerous instructions and 
apply the software S. In this case, the lower block L displays both the flight crew and 
other specialists (for example, line management), with whom maintenance special-
ists come into contact with the production necessity. However, most often under the 
central unit still understand aircrew.
Since the global goal of the work of all aviation personnel is to ensure flight 
safety, it is therefore of interest to specify the initial SHELL model in relation to 
ensuring flight safety of aircraft. It is precisely this concretization that is presented 
in Figure 2.
In the figure, in addition to the notation already known to us, there are new ones:
Lf – flight (in the original diagram, the central block L is a subject, a person).
The lower block L of the circuit can be rationally represented as a “stack” of four 
blocks: Lm – maintainer, service, operator personnel; Lt – air traveler; Lp – producer, 
manufacturer; Ld – designer.
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Specification of the model allows us to more clearly understand the complexity 
of the relationship between the elements of the aviation system. In the future, by 
performing a spatial convolution of this model, it is possible to obtain a certain 
hypercube where the faces will be the corresponding new and known elements, and 
the edges will be the relationships between them. In addition, the logic suggests 
that depending on the situation (flight mode, stage of technical operation, etc.), the 
subordination of the model elements will be different.
So, when performing aircraft maintenance, the central place of the model 
should be given to technical personnel. At the same time, cabin and cabin crews 
will take a subordinate position, providing technical personnel with the necessary 
information about the state of the aircraft, problems noticed during the flight, etc. 
The nature of the relationship between the elements will change accordingly.
The described transformation is useful in the analysis of incidents and aircraft 
accidents caused by faults in maintenance and allow you to take into account many 
contextual and analysis-related factors, including equipment design. Moreover, 
avoids the need to focus on technical staff. However, it should also be remembered 
that the complete exclusion of a person from analysis, which is resorted to by 
many experts using this model, can cause incorrect conclusions, which is unac-
ceptable when it comes to flight safety. An interesting and quite informative is the 
D. Peterson behavioral model [27] (Figure 3), which describes personnel perfor-
mance as a characteristic that depends on innate abilities and motivation, which, 
in turn, depends on a number of other factors. For example, staff selection and 
training play an important role. At the same time, the decisive role in this model 
is assigned to motivation, regardless of where this motivation comes from – from 
work, colleagues, unions, or from the person himself.
This model has wide practical application in the aviation industry. It and other 
similar models underlie the formation of the aviation personnel’s collective respon-
sibility for ensuring flight safety in airlines: voluntary safety data reporting systems; 
incentives for safe and high-quality maintenance operations, etc.
Based on the principles of the modern approach, modern Maintenance Resource 
Management (MRM) systems are built [28]. The essence of the approach is to focus 
on the psychological and social interaction of personnel within, in particular, main-
tenance teams, as well as between specialists belonging to different professional 
Figure 2. 
Specification of the SHELL model.
Safety and Risk Assessment of Civil Aircraft during Operation
18
groups. These thin, but the complex interactions found in the heart model, a bid 
R.L. Helmreich and H. C. Foushee in [29].
Interesting and very useful, in particular, for understanding the functioning 
and spread of hazardous factors within an aviation organization, is the J. Reason 
model [30].
The model uses an analogy with the physiological concept of the human immune 
system. According to the model, all organizational systems carry within themselves 
the “embryos of their own demise” in the form of some analogues of “pathogens” 
that violate the normal functions of the systems. Such organizational “pathogens” 
give rise to latent errors or, in other words, latent malfunctions in the functioning 
of the system. Latent errors can accumulate over time and interact with each other. 
Finally, this leads to the appearance of qualitatively new errors – no longer hidden, 
but obvious failures (active errors) in the system.
Investigating the paths of error, J. Reason made an important conclusion that 
the most important “pathogens” arise at high levels of leadership, since strategic 
decisions are made there. Strategic decisions are designed to provide maximum per-
formance and at the same time – the greatest security of the system as a whole. This 
thesis by J. Reason was welcomed by safety experts and international organizations.
The following model deserves to be examined in more detail – this is the 
J. Reason accident causality model [17, 31], which can be found in various manuals 
and circulars, both international and regional civil aviation organizations, as well as 
in various departmental documents.
This model, known as the Swiss Cheese model (Figure 4), explains how people 
cause dysfunctions of complex, interacting and well-protected systems (such as a 
commercial transportation system), resulting in an accident. If a strategic, concep-
tual decision is made incorrectly, and this is not compensated by the common sense 
of linear management (“getting into” the second “window”), and preconditions 
(organization of labor, availability of equipment) do not allow revealing a poten-
tially dangerous defect and, moreover, when in the event of an emergency there is 
no means to prevent its transition into a catastrophic one – the windows in all the 
barriers coincided and the accident leads to dire consequences.
One can imagine that these obstacles (like in a good shooting range) swing 
under the influence of specific conditions (personal experiences of the leader, 
Figure 3. 
Peterson’s motivation, reward, and satisfaction model.
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delayed maintenance of the aircraft and reduced time for maintenance, equipment 
breakdown, fatigue, illness of technical personnel), as a result of which “through 
lumbago” remains possible and even more difficult to predict.
Strictly speaking, all the components of the human factor discussed above must 
be included in the J. Reason model, preconditions, and also (zero barrier) environ-
mental conditions. In fact, this model has incorporated all the best of the theories 
and models considered above.
The model interprets the incident as a coincidence in time during the flight of 
imperfection at the same time in several levels of protection against an accident. In 
addition, for the implementation of an accident during a flight, conditions must 
arise that are critical when there is a coincidence of the “windows” in the protec-
tion levels.
For the efficient and productive work of the maintenance technical staff, certain 
preconditions must be met: the equipment must be available and reliable; employ-
ees – qualified and interested; working conditions – safe, contributing to high 
quality; various precautions, usually designed to prevent foreseeable bodily harm, 
damage or costly interruptions.
If one or more of these conditions is not met, the work of the maintenance 
personnel does not guarantee the prevention of an accident (for example, the 
specialist will not be able to detect a hidden defect if the necessary equipment is not 
available). Let us turn to an example that may give a clearer understanding of all of 
the above.
4.1 Example
The crash of DC-10-10 of American Airlines on May 25, 1979 [32].
The crash occurred from– for failure flight control system after termination 
of the left engine at the end of the takeoff roll (node had 19,871 hour operating 
time) killed 271 people on board and 2 people on the ground. The root cause of 
the disaster was not enough quality securing the left engine pylon after his regular 
replacement. After replacing the engine, maintenance specialists improperly 
tightened the pylon mount bolts, which caused bending stresses in the nodes and, 
ultimately, their fatigue failure. The immediate cause of the disaster was the spon-
taneous cleaning of six sections of the slats of the outer part of the left console and 
the failure of two alarm systems in the cockpit caused by damage to the hydraulic 
Figure 4. 
Model causation accident J. Reason.
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systems and control system when the engine with the pylon was separated from the 
wing. From – for a fault in the alarm system of the discrepancy between the position 
of the slats and their control knobs, as well as failure in the device control column 
pilots were unable to correctly identify the arisen emergency situation and pre-
vent its transition to a catastrophic, although in principle it was possible. The low 
altitude and, as a result, the small time available for decision-making played a role. 
To confirm the validity of the approach, we analyze this incident from the point of 
view of the J. Reason model, a variant of which is shown in Figure 5.
In the diagram, the first condition from the incident is a flight situation, environ-
mental conditions. The aircraft was at a low altitude and had not yet gained cruising 
speed, as a result of which there was a short available time for the crew to evaluate 
the situation and make a decision, as well as low efficiency of the controls and fast 
dumping of the aircraft in a tailspin. Further, qualified and conscientious specialists 
usually carry out the replacement of the engine. It is hard to imagine that there was 
a “criminal negligence.” Most likely, they did not have a calibrated key for tightening 
the bolt with the necessary effort. Although it is possible that the mounting bolts 
were counterfeit (the problem was noticed after the crash of the Partvair Convair 580 
aircraft on September 8, 1989). But someone decided to purchase such “cheap” bolts. 
It was unlikely that this was a personal initiative of someone from the line manage-
ment. Most likely, the “strategy” of using such components was given the leadership 
of the company, which constantly has to resolve the contradiction between the cost 
of operating the aircraft price (competitiveness) on the ticket s and profit. Although 
it cannot be that the line management did not know about such a policy, they did not 
oppose this and did not conduct sufficient explanatory work with service specialists. 
Thus, the incident considered is quite consistent with the J. Reason model.
5. Conclusion
Unfortunately, the material presented above is only an excerpt from the accu-
mulated over more than 30 years of activity in the field of safety research and the 
human factor. Nevertheless, we hope that we were able to state the very essence of 
the problem and clearly define the relationship between the causes of dangerous 
actions of personnel, the dangerous actions themselves and their consequences in 
the key to solving the human factor problems in aircraft maintenance.
In considering the issues of modeling were considered only the most commonly 
used in aircraft conceptual model of human. They do not imply a mathematical 
formalization of the problem, however, as shown by the authors’ studies in the field 
Figure 5. 
A model of causation of an accident built on the basis of the model of Professor J. Reason.
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of military aviation, some of them, for example, the J. Reason model (Figure 4), 
can be successfully formalized to obtain quantitative characteristics of personnel 
reliability. Naturally, there are other approaches to modeling staff activities. In 
particular, probability-theoretical analysis models are known. They are widely used 
in engineering research on safety issues and have their own characteristics.
In conclusion, I would like to focus on the fact that absolute models do not exist, 
especially when it comes to studying human errors. The researcher himself has to 
answer, how useful it a particular model. In any case, we hope that the material 
presented in this chapter will be useful from the point of view of expanding and 
structuring information about this most relevant area of research.
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